

Foreword

I. The Project

This Special Issue contains some of the research papers written in the course of a project entitled *Towards a political ontology of violence: reality, image and perception*. This was a three-year Internationalisation project awarded to Herman Siemens from the Institute for Philosophy at Leiden University. The project consisted of three three-day workshops with 12-15 participants from philosophy, together with sociologists, psychologists, image theorists, literary theorists, feminist theorists, artists and clinical psychologists. The aim was to do the groundwork through exploratory, multi-disciplinary exchanges for a large project concerning the question of *political violence* and its relation to *the image*.

The project takes off from two theses. The first is that violence is not a disturbance in contemporary democracies, not an exception, but a fact of political life, a political reality, whether in long-established democracies (Europe, the US), or in transitional or mixed democracies elsewhere. If so, we need to confront this reality theoretically: we need a political ontology of violence. The *aim* of the project is to study the ways in which acts of violence – from the attacks on Charlie Hebdo to the act of self-immolation that sparked off the Arab revolts – are impacting on democratic politics within and outside Europe. Our central question is whether the making public of grievances through acts of violence and the circulation of images of violence in the media can be understood *in political terms* as part of a new *res publica* or public sphere that spans the globe.

There is an urgent need to confront acts of violence and violent conflicts as a political reality, in order to understand these developments better and the directions they might take. Yet the concept of political violence is far from clear. What is it that makes a given act or form of violence a *specifically political reality*? How can violence be conceptualised as part of *political life*, and especially: democratic political life? What, in short, is violence as a *political concept* and what roles does it play in advancing or exploding democratic ideals? In our view, standard approaches to political violence fall short of these questions. Typically theorists take political violence to be just a subset of the generic concept of intraspecific violence, where it has political conditions or consequences, or is a means to political ends.¹ But this generic approach fails to capture the specificity of political violence, that is, violence as an element of the specific domain of political reality or relations, rather than one domain among others to which a general concept of violence can be applied. Alternatively, political violence is taken to be “the most flagrant manifestation of power,”² where political power is understood as the rule of man over man, or (following Foucault) to be intrinsic to the all-pervasive but invisible exercise of disciplinary power. But none of these approaches captures the way violence is bound up with, *but distinct from* political power and other political realities, such as domination,

¹ For example: “Political violence is merely a modest subset of the human spectrum of intraspecific violence.” Jeff Victoroff and Janice Adelman, “Why Do Individuals Resort to Political Violence? Approaches to the Psychology of Terrorism,” in *The Ashgate Research Companion to Political Violence*, ed. Marie Breen-Smyth (London: Routledge, 2012/ 20160323. VitalBook file). Or again: “I take violence to be the predictable, coercive, and usually sudden infliction of injury upon or damage harming persons. Such violence is political when it has political aims, such as to change a government’s policies or undermine its credibility,” Virginia Held, “The Media and Political Violence,” *The Journal of Ethics* 1/2 (1997): 187-202.

² Hannah Arendt *On Violence* (New York: Harcourt, 1970), 35-38.

authority, governmentality, revolution, insurrection, civil disobedience etc. At the same time, our questions also oppose Arendt's claim that the concept of political violence is self-contradictory, because violence is antipolitical³; they serve instead to open it up to thought.

We need to ask, for instance, whether political violence is a form or feature of political agency, of certain "violent" acts or even of (non-agential) events – Or whether it lies rather within political relations of certain kinds, and especially: in the way in which an act is received and responded to by others in the global *res publica*. With Arendt, we need to distinguish violence from other key categories of political thought with which it is often conflated – power, domination, authority, governmentality, revolution etc. – in order to understand better the heterogeneous forms of political violence in the complex phenomena in which they occur.

The second thesis from which the project departs is that the *ontological question* of violence as a political reality is inseparable from *aesthetic questions* concerning the images or representations of violence to which we are exposed, their circulation, especially in social and public media, their impact and political consequences. It was not just the act of self-immolation, but the images of that act circulated in social media, which sparked off the Arab revolt; and it is the videos of the shootings in Paris and their impact on the public perception of this act of violence that has had political consequences. But what is it that makes a particular image an image *of violence*? It cannot simply be a matter of what is represented, since violence is represented in video games, art galleries, horror movies, documentaries and news bulletins – with no political consequences. Without erasing or diminishing the reality of the really lived experience of violence on the part of its victims, it must also be recognized that we inhabit a mediatized environment and that our access to political violence is for the most part thoroughly mediatized. Indeed it is this *diremption* – between the singularity of really lived violence and the generalized logics of our mediatized environment – and the *collision* between the real (what can be more real than violence?) and the non-reality of the image (which is never what it's about), which generate the central problems of the project. If, as the proliferation of inconsequential representations of violence suggests, we have become immune to images in our media-saturated environments (Baudrillard), then we also need to ask: What is it that makes certain images violent, so violent that they provoke acts of political violence, or acts of censorship on the part of public media or state security organs? How, in short, are we to conceptualise *images of violence* and *the violence of (certain) images*?

These are questions of philosophical aesthetics, and they need also to be posed from the practitioner's perspective: How to represent violence in its radical singularity? And how to represent violence without exploiting the victims' experience for one's own ends?⁴ The practitioner in question can be a photographer, painter, journalist, novelist or playwright, a clinical psychologist or psychotherapist, but it also always includes us as theorists trying to think and write about violence.

The purpose of the workshops was, then, to explore how the problem of political violence intersects with the aesthetic problem of the image. Political philosophers focused on the concept of political violence in relation to power, economic production, resistance, fanaticism, and sexual violence in transitional democracies. In this issue, their work appears in papers by Andrea Rossi, Howard Caygill, Frank Chouraqui, and Louise du Toit, whose focus on the case of South Africa and the complex relations between colonialism and sexual violence is complemented by Lou-Marie Kruger's account of violence in intimate relationships in a South African township.

³ See Richard J. Bernstein, *Violence: Thinking without Banisters* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2013), 210.

⁴ For an eloquent exposition of this problem by South African artist William Kentridge see: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=m1oK5LMJ3zY> (accessed April 5, 2019).

Researchers in aesthetics and image theory addressed a range of topics, such as the use of shadows for imaging violence (Susana Oliveira); Alice Harris's photographs of the victims of colonial violence in the Belgian Congo and their political repercussions (Katia Hay); media representations of male rape in the Bosnian war and their implications for the construction of identities (Dubravka Zarkov); the images used by ISIS and their manipulation in Dabiq, their online magazine (Emmanuel Alloa), to name a few. This issue includes papers that were given on gender-based image-censorship on social media, understood as a violent response to certain images (Katia Hay); on the difficulties of portraying the experience of domestic violence in survivors without exposing their identities or falling into standardised narratives that efface their experience (Susana Campos et al); and on the construction of false, gendered national identities through cinematographic techniques in the film "In the Land of Blood and Honey" (Dubravka Zarkov and Rada Drezgic). In the course of the project, the problem of the image was extended to include literary representations of violence, with papers on violence perpetrated against abstract entities (art, science) in novels by Conrad and Mishima (Carlos Correia, included in this issue), on critical dystopias, and the use of estrangement (*Verfremdung*) in the play by Jane Taylor and William Kentridge "Ubu and the Truth Commission" on the TRC in South Africa (Mathias Thaler), to name a few.

Finally, there were papers that draw on thinkers from the past, in line with the working hypothesis of the project that the history of modern philosophy houses invaluable and understudied conceptual resources for rethinking contemporary problems. In his analysis of contemporary eco-resistance / -rebellion, Howard Caygill draws on the theory of resistance developed by Clausewitz in the context of Spanish guerrilla warfare against the Napoleonic army. Herman Siemens turns to Alexander Baumgarten, the founder of modern aesthetics, for a conceptual vocabulary that can describe images in their otherness to discourse and in particular: the power of certain images to unsettle our habitual patterns of perception and open it up to radical singularity. Also included in this issue are two papers that draw on Schelling's thought. Katia Hay's main concern is to formulate a non-mimetic conception of the image that nonetheless retains a connection to reality, and to use it to interrogate acts of censorship, while Satya Das develops a Schellingian critique of the violence of the concept in favour of the language of narrative, and a critique of the image as a distortion of man *as imago Dei* in the service of our violent assertion of sovereignty over all other beings.

II. The Papers

The papers selected for this issue have been organized under a number of headings. Under the heading **The Problem of Violence** are papers that address a number of fundamental philosophical problems raised by violence: What is the epistemology behind fanaticism and what is wrong with it (Chouraqui)? Does the affirmative impulse in the eco-resistance practised by Extinction Rebellion represent a transformation of reactive concepts of resistance, or does it go beyond resistance altogether (Caygill)? To what extent can the violence unleashed by neo-liberalism be understood, not just as a destructive force, but as one productive of order, unity and subjectivities within what Bataille called the "restricted economy" (Rossi)? Under this heading are also the two papers with a geo-political focus on South Africa. Louise de Toit examines the way sexuality was used to produce differences between the colonisers and the colonised and its impact on levels of sexual violence in South Africa today, in order to ask how to theorize sexual violence without replicating colonial structures. Lou-Marie Kruger draws on her experience as a clinical psychologist working for many years in a South African township to reflect on the roles played by guilt and shame in the violence that marks so many intimate relationships.

Under the heading **On Violence and the Image / The Violence of the Image** are the papers that focus on the relation of images and violence in the context of the problem of censorship in social media (Katia Hay), the problem of our damaged perception and consequent immunity to images of violence in our media-saturated environment (Herman Siemens), and the law-positing violence of the state (Satya Das). In different ways, these three papers interrogate violence as a feature of the image, i.e. the violence of the image, whether in terms of the disproportionate response by censors to certain images (Hay), or the way certain images can break through mediatized logics of image-exchange and open our perception to violence in its radical singularity (Siemens), or those images that want to be absolute and total and impose their order on the world (Das).

Under the third heading **Images of Violence / Imagining Violence** are papers dealing specifically with the ways in which violence is or can be represented and misrepresented. Concentrating on two novelistic representations of violence against abstract entities (by Mishima and Conrad), Carlos Correia analyses such violence as an expulsion or “vomiting” of norms – the authority of science (Conrad) and the authority of religion (Mishima) – previously internalised or “ingested” through identification. In their critique of the film *In the Land of Blood and Honey*, Dubravka Zarkov and Rada Drezgic argue that cinematic tropes borrowed from other genres serve to misrepresent the complex sources of violence and sexual violence in the Bosnian war. Susana Campos, by contrast, addresses the representation of violence from the practitioner’s point of view, as a painter who ran a participatory art project on domestic violence with women in two shelters. Among the different challenges discussed is the difficulty of breaking with standardized representations of domestic violence in the media in order to capture the singularity of the violence experienced by every participant. Susana Campos’s solution is intriguing and paradoxical: a fast-moving mosaic of different portraits of the women involved.

These three headings are, of course, merely indicative and are not meant to exclude significant connections between the papers in different sections. From the beginning of the project it became apparent how important sexual violence is as a form of political violence that has often been de-politicised as a private or domestic matter. In this issue it is addressed by du Toit, Campos, Zarkov and Kruger. Of importance are also the often inconspicuous but insidious forms of “slow violence” (Rob Nixon) unleashed by global neo-liberalism, which serve as the starting point or theoretical background for several of the papers – by Caygill, Kruger, Rossi and du Toit. In different ways, the need for consistency or cognitive closure and the fear of ambiguity plays a key role in Chouraqui’s account of fanaticism and Siemens’s account of the “disgust” provoked by images that capture violence in its radical singularity. Indeed, the notions of radical singularity and particularity are a key element in several papers. For Das, the singularity of existence, the *that* of existence, forever exceeds and escapes the violent grasp of the concept (in search of the *what* of being). For Siemens, radical singularity is the signature of the really lived experience of violence, occluded by the generalized logics of image-exchange and -sharing in our mediatized environment. Certain “violent” images can, however, break through these logics and confront us with the concrete particular in its qualitative singularity. Such images, understood in Baumgartian terms as dynamic complexes of shifting relations that nonetheless remain identifiable wholes, receive an astonishing expression in the rapidly shifting mosaic of portraits devised by Susana Campos to represent the survivors of domestic violence: “Aiming to capture a composite portrait of all participants involved, each moment gave way to a different face, which was a mash-up of different women. Directed to a representation of particulars rather than standard concepts, it makes visible the “normalcy” perceived in individual women, while describing some of the different emotional states observed during the interaction” (See infra, S. Campos :). The problem of representing violence is also central to Lou-Marie Kruger’s work and her paper in this issue.

As both a theoretician and clinician, she criticizes academic writing for obscuring the lives it theorizes and takes on Rob Nixon's challenge to make visible the lives of those permeated by the invisible, slow violence of attrition by devising stories, images and dialogues in her style of creative non-fiction.

III. Thinking Violence

In the course of the three workshops I learned a great deal from fellow participants, above all how very difficult it is to think violence without turning into an abstraction something that occurs in myriad, utterly heterogeneous forms. In this section I offer some reflections on the question of violence, thoughts that represent my attempt to bring together and make sense of the very different perspectives that were presented and discussed at the course of the project.

We all know what violence is. When we speak of violence – whether in conversation, public discourse, even academic discourse – we speak as if we all know what it is we are speaking about. And let me add: I think we are right. Whether we speak with Mondzain of our "complicity—if not an intimacy—with the force of violence," given that "the force of life is built on reserves of violence"⁵; or with Nietzsche of the hatred, cruelty and tyrannical impulses needed to overcome the resistance of others to the processes of assimilation, ingestion and incorporation that all living beings must perform if they are to live⁶; with Schiller of the form-giving violence done by mechanical artists to their material⁷; or with Arendt of "the element of violence of violation" that is "present in all fabrication,"⁸ the necessary violence involved in bending any material to our will in the process of making: it is clear, as the above authors have shown, that as living, world-making creatures, we all have a first-hand, pre-reflexive familiarity, intimacy, even complicity with violence. If this right, if we know what violence is, this means that the problem of violence is *not* an epistemological problem. But it does not follow from that we know how to think violence.

Violence is not, for a start, an empirical concept, that is to say: the term does not denote a common observable element – such as for example concrete forces impacting on objects – shared by a range of different phenomena, allowing us to determine whether a given phenomenon is violent by asking whether it meets the criterion or "definition" that enables us to subsume it under that concept. There are several reasons why this is to misconstrue the meaning of the term "violence."

The first is that violence is not a phenomenon at all, not an empirical datum waiting to be picked out by a careful, neutral observer. Indeed – and here I have to be careful not to give the wrong impression to victims of violence – I would go so far to say that violence *as such*

⁵ Marie-José Mondzain and Sally Shafto: "Can Images Kill?," *Critical Inquiry* 36/1 (Autumn 2009): 20-51;24.

⁶ "Growth and generation follow the unlimited *drive to appropriate*. — this drive brings it [the living being - HS] to the exploitation of the weaker, and to competition with those of similar strength, it [the appropriative drive - HS] *struggles i.e. it hates, fears, disguises itself*. Even assimilation is: to make something alien *like oneself, to tyrannise — cruelty*." Note 11[134] in Friedrich Nietzsche, *Sämtliche Werke. Kritische Studienausgabe in 15 Bänden*, ed.s Giorgio Colli/Mazzino Montinari (Munich/Berlin/New York: DTV/De Gruyter), vol. 9, 491. Henceforth KSA.

⁷ "When the mechanical artist places his hand on the formless block, to give it a form according to his intention, he has not any scruples in doing violence to it. For the nature on which he works does not deserve any respect in itself, and he does not value the whole for its parts, but the parts on account of the whole." Friedrich Schiller, *On the Aesthetic Education of Man*, English-German bilingual edition, tr. E.M. Wilkinson & L.A. Willoughby (Oxford: Clarendon/OUP 1982), Letter IV.

⁸ Hannah Arendt, *The Human Condition* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958), 139.

cannot be experienced. By this I do not mean that violence is not real. Nothing is realer. I mean rather that, as Arendt correctly pointed out, violence is always bound up in highly complex, highly circumstantial empirical-perceptual constellations and only occurs in combination with other realities and events (especially state power, but also revolt, demonstrations, "terrorist" attacks, criminal and sexual acts etc.).⁹ What is experienced is rape, enslavement, expulsion etc. What is observed is insurrection, rioting, coercion, assassination – all violent, but nowhere is there violence as such. It is not just a matter of disentangling it from these empirical constellations as a common or shared element. It cannot be disentangled at all. This, for the second reason why violence is not an empirical concept:

Violence is bound up with a wide range of utterly heterogeneous constellations and events. Apart from those listed above, they can range from crop-burning, poisoning, defenestration, rape, rioting, to misappropriation, fraud, annexation, espionage etc. etc. To presume that among these radically diverse phenomena, there is a common denominator waiting to be conceptualised by us is wishful thinking, to say the least. There is no reason to presume that violence is somehow the same across diverse phenomena, no reason why it should not take forms specific to the realities and conditions it occurs in. What is more, this form of explanation impoverishes its object by extracting it from its concrete context and subsuming it under a ready-made concept. I would say it's an impoverished form of explanation that reduces to the same the wide variety of forms violence can take and *the radical singularity of any really lived experience of violence*. Violence, as far as we are aware of it, is heterogeneous. The patterns that can emerge, do not emerge because violence is the recurrent phenomenon, but because it is part of complex events between which patterns emerge in response to recurrent or fixed conditions.

From this point of view, the problem is how to form of a concept or idea of violence without doing violence to the really lived experience of violence, which is always singular and circumstantial. This brings me to the third reason why violence is not an empirical concept, namely: that it is not a concept at all! Violence, where it occurs, resists subsumption under any concept. This brings the term "violence" in the region of aesthetic terms inherited from Kant, such as beauty, ugliness or more recently: the sublime.¹⁰ In different ways, they refer to perceptual syntheses that resist conceptualisation, or more precisely: that precede and exceed linguistic-conceptual formulation.¹¹

There is a further reason for this connection. We can define the terms we use as we like for the sake of trying to control their meaning. But in the end, we have to concede that words have a historicity that escapes our control, and we have to work with the complex of meanings and connotations that they carry. In the case of violence, I want to suggest that the use of the term – like key aesthetic terms – is inseparable from a certain response on our part to what we call violence: a rejection, a revulsion, a horror that is not just moral ("this is wrong") but physiological. This is not just a matter of loose thinking, of conflating fact and norm; it is part of what we mean when we utter the word "violence." I do not want to suggest that our

⁹ Hannah Arendt, *On Violence* (New York: Harcourt, 1970), 45ff.

¹⁰ See for instance Jean-Luc Nancy "The Sublime Offering," in *Of the Sublime: Presence in Question* (New York: SUNY Press, 1993); Jean-Luc Nancy "Image et violence," *Le Portique* 6 (2000), <https://journals.openedition.org/leportique/451?lang=en> (accessed April 2, 2019); Jean-Luc Nancy, *The Ground of the Image*, (New York: Fordham, 2003); Jean-François Lyotard, *The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984). Jacques Rancière, *Aesthetics and its Discontents* (London: Polity, 2009).

¹¹ The claim that violence precedes and exceeds the rationality of Hegelian dialectics is characteristic of the anti-Hegelian (or post-Hegelian) turn in modern French philosophy – Deleuze, Foucault, Bataille, Blanchot inter alia. Several of these intellectuals have also argued that violence is beyond language.

response is disinterested, as Kant insisted in the context of aesthetics, but on the contrary that violence has a direct relation to pain when we perceive or experience it, and to a profoundly interested and embodied rejection; there is no neutral observational standpoint in this matter. But this is not to aestheticize violence. Rather, it means that the problem of thinking violence is not an epistemological problem, nor a definitional problem: it is a problem of judgement, and specifically: of reflective judgement.

As is well known reflective judgement in Kant stands for the problem of thinking in the absence of a concept, a thinking that attends first and foremost to the concrete singularity of an event or object we perceive and looks to create a concept for it. The *modus operandi* of reflective judgement is inference by analogy.¹² What exactly this involves is far from clear – Kant himself distinguishes three different forms of philosophical analogy¹³ – but I would like to make three key points:

1. Inference by analogy needs to be distinguished from the other *modus operandi* of reflective judgement: inference from induction. While both, as processes of concept-formation, move from particulars to universals, they do so in very different ways.¹⁴ Induction, as the process by which we form empirical concepts, abstracts from the differences between particulars in favour of properties they have in common. Its principle, Kant says, is universalisation and its function is to discern (or anticipate) systematic unity. Analogy, by contrast operates according to the principle of specification and can take different forms. It is not, however, after systematic unity, does not make universal judgements about all objects that have a certain property, and does not abstract from the differences between particulars in order to form a concept for them. This suggests that analogical thinking addresses the problem just mentioned: enabling us to form of concepts or ideas of violence without doing violence to the really lived experience of violence, which is always singular and circumstantial.
2. If this is right it may point to a way of thinking the problem of violence together with the problem of the image. In the workshop paper included in this issue, I argue that certain images can be thought in terms of what Alexander Baumgarten calls “the logic of the individual”; that is, as dynamic complexes of shifting relations, pre-conceptual syntheses. The claim is that they defeat the standardised images and narratives that immunize us against really lived violence by confronting us with the concrete particular in its qualitative singularity, understood as a plurality of shifting relations and meanings. If put in this way, it looks like the effort to form concepts of violence by way of analogy in reflective judgement tracks the same logic of the individual or what Kant calls “specification.” This kind of thinking takes off from perceptual syntheses that resist (precede and exceed) conceptualisation. Unlike induction, it does not efface the differences between particulars in order to form a concept for them but enables us instead to form concepts or ideas of violence without doing violence to the really lived experience of violence, which is always singular and circumstantial. And like the encounter with violent images, it is inseparable from a rejection, revulsion or horror. For Baumgarten, our sensate encounter with the

¹² This is the main thesis of the PhD dissertation by Constanza Terra: *Analogy, Technical Reason, and Living Beings: The Role of Analogy in Representing Kant's Concept of Naturzweck* (University of Leiden: May 2019). See especially chapter 3.3 and 3.5.

¹³ The “Analogies of Experience” (of which there are three forms), analogical inference and symbolic analogy (*ibid.*).

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 90.

concrete particular defeats conceptual knowledge, provoking a fear of ambiguity that leads to disgust and rejection.

3. Given that analogical thinking, as the *modus operandi* of reflective judgement, is also one of the principal forms of metaphor, we can say that violence is metaphorical. I do not mean this as a criticism or as an unhelpful extension of a clearly defined concept, but as our only recourse in the face of something that cannot be objectified as a concept or an empirical datum, but occurs only at the interface of perception and horror and defeats conceptual packaging.

Thus far, the question of violence has been discussed in a very vague and generic sense. In my concluding remarks, I want to return to my initial proposition that we need to think political violence, not as a mere subset of the human spectrum of intra-specific violence, but as a constitutive element of political reality. Transposing the preceding reflections onto the plane of political reality, I want to suggest (by analogy!) that thinking political violence is a problem of *political judgement*. And in this regard, I would like to draw on one of the dangers surrounding political judgement to which Nietzsche's philosophical physiology alerts us. It concerns Arendt's desideratum that political judgement involves the capacity to "think in the place of everybody else" in the name of a shared, collective standpoint.¹⁵ When translated into a physiological register, there can be no question of transcending or abstracting from our own point of view in this sense; the physiological dynamic is always one of assimilation, of incorporation, of taking on what is alien, driven by our life-interests in growth and expansion. Against this background, the task of political judgement becomes instead that of taking on what is hard to assimilate, because in its very otherness it is troubling or uncomfortable for us. The process of assimilation is, however, profoundly ambivalent: on the one hand it can signify this task¹⁶; on the other hand, it can signify the reduction of the other to oneself, a treatment of others that violates their otherness by reducing it to ourselves (*Gleichmachung des Nichtgleichen*).¹⁷ Nietzsche's physiology introduces a tension between these two possibilities into the logic of political judgement; it reminds us of the profound difficulty of taking on the perspectives of others in a way that keeps their diversity intact without undermining our own identity or autonomy of thought, and the ever-present risk of failure. Again this difficulty seems to map onto the problem of thinking violence set out earlier, and the difference between induction, which abstracts from the singularity of really lived violence, and analogical thinking with its promise of a reflective concept of violence that does not violate singularity or the heterogeneous forms taken by violence.

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¹⁵ Hannah Arendt, "The Crisis in Culture," in *Between Past and Future* (New York: Viking Press, 1961), 220f.

¹⁶ "Everybody continually **excludes**, separates that which is of *no* use to it in the assimilated being [...]. But their unknowing "reason" often designates for them as evil what causes them trouble, what is uncomfortable, the other, the enemy, they **confuse** that which is *useless* with that which is difficult to acquire, to conquer to incorporate." (note 11[134], KSA 9, p. 491f.).

¹⁷ See for instance note 2[92], KSA 12, 106; NL 5[65], KSA 1, 209; note 9[144], KSA 12, 418.

Acknowledgements

Most of the papers in this special issue are revised versions of papers given and discussed at workshops within the project: *Towards a political ontology of violence: reality, image and perception*. The guest editor and authors would like to thank the institutions that made the project possible through their generous funding: the NWO (Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research), as well as some of the participating institutes: the Centre for Research in Modern European Philosophy (CRMEP) at Kingston University, London; the Department of Philosophy at Stellenbosch University, South Africa; the Center of Philosophy at the University of Lisbon (CFUL - Centro de Filosofia da Universidade de Lisboa); and the College of Social Sciences and Humanities at Koç University, Turkey.